Saturday, May 26, 2012

A "Resolution" of the Problem of Evil

In the recent Stand to Reason blog, in an article called the "Problem of Good," Gregory Koukl posted that the so-called problem of evil has more difficulties in promoting an atheistic mind-set than a theistic one.  He points out:  But the atheist must also take his turn offering his own explanation, and his task faces a complication the theist does not encounter. He must explain how evil itself could exist in the first place to make room for his complaint. He must account for the objective, transcendent moral standard that has to be in position before moral judgments of any kind can be made.

This difficulty signals an additional problem: The atheist must also solve the problem of good. How can anything ultimately be evil or good in a universe bereft of any standard to make sense of the terms?

The atheist does have a solution worth pondering, essentially depicting "good" and "evil" as human constructs each without ontological basis of reality.  One atheist comment raised the philosophical defense of skepticism: An atheist is under no obligation to develop a complex theory about why evil or good exist, because for him, the universe is ultimately meaningless. There is no need to explain something that does not make sense. It just is. How he deals with that in his day-to-day life results in the creation of a specific moral code. Many develop this code based on some version of Utilitarianism, in which the determining consideration of right conduct should be the usefulness of its consequences. It is not useful to have people murdering each other, so murder is 'bad.' It is useful to be able to trust other people, so honesty is 'good.' Good and bad are not absolutes, merely more or less effective ways of running society for the benefit of the largest number of people.

While a noteworthy response, it lacks substance in the fact that events of "good" and "evil" are easily demonstrable.  We could initiate a pogrom against a group of atheists, and after a season of persecution, we might survey them on the effects and validity of such treatment.  Base denial of evil would allow for a continuation of the pogrom for a longer time.  The issue of utilitarianism would be satisfied if a majority of citizens would see a useful employment of such a segment of society so that a perceived arrogance might be curtailed.  At any rate, after a season of abuse, all parties may come to a conclusion that such an approach to an atheistic community was too high handed and unworthy of consideration for any group for any perception of that group, correct as it might be deemed.

If evil does exist, then we remain with the problem that a world that is governed by an omnipotent, omniscient deity is incompatible with the reality of evil in the world.  For all the arguments that I have heard for and against the reality of a powerful, benign God in a world teeming with evil, I would approach this matter from what may be a novel position.  Let us posit both God and evil in the world, and imagine that God be granted the opportunity to remove the issue of evil or vindicate the reality of evil in spite of God.  To my mind, there would be two solutions, but would inquire toward more possibilities. 

1.  The world can be resolved from evil, but the present evil has some role for which God allows.

In my reasoning, I would imagine that God is given a chance to deal with the evil-problem as a landlord would deal with some plumbing or heating problem in his rentals.  If He is a responsible landlord, He would see to the problem.  If, however, He doesn't, are there attendant circumstances that would explain the matter?  Has the rent been paid, or has the rental show malicious vandalism to the rental that would make the landlord's simple fixing of the problem moot?  Does the renter damage the rooms as the repairs are made, making such repetitious repairs unreasonable?  Has the landlord some issue with the responsibilities of the renter that makes the obvious issue of making repair and restitution of the renter's needs?  Is it possible that repairs shall be initiated in the future once the renter has complied over some matter?  You see, a simple fix-job may not be simple as all that.

In extending the issue to the problem of evil, it can be maintained that the world of evil was initiated by man in defiance of God, that sin warps the perfect world so that the bad, the awful, the unspeakable does occur.  Most evil is inflicted man-to-man.  Natural events such as tsunamis may in the end be ultimately anthropogenic.  The Scriptures speaks of the world "groaning and sighing" under the weight of human consequence (Rom 8: 20-22).  Evil is a natural by-product of a world hijacked for human programs and humanistic appeals, which cannot sustain progress without digression into oppression.  Evil is what man has allowed it to become, and we pay the price of the mistake.  As a landlord cannot resolve an issue that the renter continues to sabotage, neither can God resolve the evil-problem, hardly as a favor to man, much less on human merit.

2.  A resolution to the evil-problem would be too radical for human security and safety.

To return to the landlord-belligerent renter metaphor, one option a landlord would be able to accomplish is the eviction of the renter.  Once removed, the problem is solved.  In this case, is the problem of evil a human construct itself, solved by the eradication of the human race?  We hold that such a solution is evil in itself.  Thus, this cannot be an acceptable solution, even if it might be argued that it would be ultimately fair.

The solution is settled in the concept that evil is always something that God can counter, being able to work for the good of those that love Him.  Evil remains a divine pronouncement on a human league that opposes divine intents, as evil is a human derivative.  But divine efforts can seek to ameliorate the decay, and faith trusts the ultimate goal is a restored world where evil is banished.

Would that mankind sees the role of evil in a blemished world under reconstruction.

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

The Adequacy of Fideism

Having reviewed the concept of understanding the idea of God totally by faith is not an accepted approach in the field of apologetics.  The core of the issue is proving the reality of religious experience which has been pursued on philosophical grounds.  The historical arguments of cosmological, ontological, moral, and teleological premises have indicated that belief in God is a possibly logical venture, but atheists have spoken against these issues, and the clear victories of William Lane Craig in his manifold debates came when his atheist opponents refused to counter these arguments.  Silverman, Law, and Kappel prove that a belligerent approach to the historic arguments reaps disaster, revealing a closed-mindedness to what could be strong ideas; Milligan performed far better in his British debate with Craig for this same reason.

To return to fideism.  The ability to find absolute proof for God's existence is just that, debatable.  And in the whole of all human experience, our ability to arrive at truth concepts is based on the opinion that such truth statements are attainable, or that the scientific dependancy on the observable can produce truth.  Such foundations is fideisitic.  I am confident that science can accomplish many positive things, heal diseases, offer convenience, fascilitate processes.  But is this the core of approaching truth claims?  I can by evaluating the observations I encounter daily to survive day by day.  I look both ways before crossing streets, scan my ever-changing driving environments to guarantee safe passage for myself and my family.  But in doing so, I must trust my eyesight and the ability of my brain to evaluate the present situations.  Truth seems to be a consious blend to evaluate and observe well, with the confidence that I am not being deceived in doing so.

In the matter of salvation, it does not depend on how many brain cells that have to be activated toward such a status salvus.  It relies on a pledge of divine sources compelled by divine assurances.  I may be able to offer demonstrations of this faith foundation as being valid in and of itself.  But it rests on faith alone.  If we examine this concept, how much of life is living in this realm of trusting what we have come to perceive, if not see?  Colin Tudge is entirely accurate:  Indeed, atheism—when you boil it down—is little more than dogma: simple denial, a refusal to take seriously the proposition that there could be more to the universe than meets the eye.

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

On the Explanation of Understanding

This event happened a long time ago, but it has been a point of great realization.

The glass of juice I was drinking from was extremely wet from condensation.  I had drawn a track of this moisture on the kitchen table and had placed the glass on the surface.  With a slight touch of the glass, I marveled at the fact that the glass rode the slick surface for a distance of about five inches.  A simple scientific stunt.  But a stunner to a young child.

I wished to explain this to my teacher at the time, so when I had gotten to school I went to my teacher and remarked in the best wording I could muster: "Teacher, I made a wet 'r' and the glass moved!"

I remember the puzzled look on my kindergarten teacher's face and probably figured (even for a five-year old) that my teacher didn't understand the phenomenon that I had witnessed at my breakfast.  I could only say, "I made a wet 'r' and the glass moved."  As a kindergartener, I didn't have the vocabulary to explain; I knew nothing of the words "condensation," "moisture," or even "phenomenon."  All I knew was that there was this slightly curved track of moisture that allowed my drinking glass to move a slight distance.  But it was something remarkable to my young mind, and I wished to explain it all with a childish "I made a wet 'r' and the glass moved."  But I grew up, gained the right words, and can easily explain what I had observed decades ago.  Now, where is that teacher today?

In dealing with the miraculous, we often feel we lack a command of the situation to explain.  Perhaps it is because in our intellectual vocabulary, we lack the adequacy of words, and not because we lose grip of the real.  It is definitely a response to the Humian challenge of the miracle.  Science cannot support it, but in time the right mode for understanding becomes available.  Perhaps science becomes the impediment to a raised sense of awareness.

A mere thought, easily dismissed.  But if we wed ourselves too much to the faith of scientism, we may lose too much.