The "Grounded" Ontological Argument -- Part One "Definitions"

I have never felt the ultimate power to convince a skeptic using the ontological argument.  This is a proposition expressed in many ways, beginning with the original argument of Anselm:

1. God is by definition that then which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. It is one thing to exist in the understanding only and another to exist both in the understanding and outside the understanding (example: the painting in the painter's mind vs. the painting in the painter's mind and on canvass).
3. It is greater to exist both in the understanding and outside the understanding than in the understanding only.
4.  Therefore, God must exist both in the understanding and outside the understanding, for if He did not, then we could conceive of One who did, which would be greater.  But God by definition is the greatest Being conceivable.

5. Therefore, God must exist.

This argument has been refined through the ages to Plantiga's recent development:

1.  If God does not exist, His existence is logically impossible.
2.  If God does exist, His existence is logically necessary.
3.  Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or else it is logically necessary.
4.  If God's existence is logically impossible, the concept of God is contradictory.
5.  The concept of God is not contradictory.
6.  Therefore, God's existence is logically necessary.

The grounds for rejection of the argument is the connotations of definition.  We cannot merely grant reality for anything by presenting a definition of it.  This was the thrust of Dawkin's "Flying Spaghetti Monster" assertion.  The imagination is capable of creating many illusions, hardly grounded in reality.

But then, something bizarre happened, and it gave pause to the low opinion of Anselm's argument for God.

And it had everything to do with the Flying Spaghetti Monster.  For in making such mocking attacks on God with such an approach, solid understanding of this being began to jel.  We saw drawings of the creature, observed "emissaries" of this pseudo-deity practice their pseudo-faith in garb drawn from this conceptualization of the FSM.  Slowly, this figment grew into the realm of reality, that at the name of the FSM, we pretty much had an idea of this being.  It was a realistic presentation of the unreal, consistently and patterned.

We had defined the FSM, drew lines of understanding about the FSM, and brought the FSM into the real.

In short, the FSM became a victim of the ontological argument.

This is an approach to the ontological argument that  needs examination.  We have a bevy of imaginary creatures which, on mention, draws identical imagery, similar patterns of understanding.  How so?  This is what I call the "Grounded" or "Foundational" aspect of the ontological argument.  Why have we identical understanding of things that we perceive to be imaginary?  Is there a basis to this understanding, and does it eventually ground them in reality?

It is the epistemological "leap" that I would explore.