A quick review. The previous lines of posts dealt with the thrust of the Ontological Argument and the view of the definition linked to reality. With a quick undetstanding of the ontological argument, we examined briefly the historical background of how the imaginary entities gained definition, a uniform understanding of things unreal. Events in history lead to conceptions of things that were legendary, events that were reconstructed or embellished.
But now it comes to the issue of God. What is the basis of a historical defining of God-hood? It is a simple case of what we have noted in all things else. We saw short people. We conceived dwarfs and embellished to fairies. We saw large lizards. We conceived dragons. We were deluded in conclusing so.
But in God, we have such difficulty, as God in His attributes is transcendent. But in the case of theophany, such impossibility becomes improbable at best. Theophanies are rare, but only one proves the Deity. Such phenomena would be awesome in presentation. But we cannot handle it as a unicorn. (That was a horse and a branch that you saw in a strange agle making it look like a horn in the forehead). To say, "Thunderstorms are awesome, but merely natural displays of power ..." misses the point. We aren't speaking of thunders crash and lightnings flash, but an appearance with conversation. What occurred to Abraham, Moses, Jesus can't be reduced to meteorology.
We can cull out phony theophanies as certain micickings of desirable events. The crude appearance of gods to copulate with young women is nothing compared to the assuming of the role of chariot driver to talk over the role of warfare. We may note the varieties, but must conclude the likelihood of the theophanic situation.
God can be defined from historical grounds. These occasions can be reasonable assumed to be probable. If God has been presented to anyone, such can be historically true. The fact the God is definably uniform hold this case together.
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